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Conﬁdential Information and PrivacyRelated Law in Canada and in
International Instruments
MARGARET ANN WILKINSON

introduction
With rapid changes in technology and communications spurring
globalization and the increasing value of information, any demonstrated international consensus around issues central to these changes cannot be independent of power struggles and coercion between
nations and multinationals. The history of international-intellectual
property instruments illustrates shifting international views on technology and communication as globalization has evolved and the
value of information in the new world economy has become evident.1 This shift has occurred simultaneously with the realization of
a borderless communication world and virtual communities. More
and more individuals in every society find themselves involved with
intellectual-property interests that in the industrial age were in the
purview of and preoccupied relatively few.
As intellectual property becomes more democratized in its reach
and impact through the new technology and new mass media, its
increasing diffusion brings it more frequently into the realm of other
interests and values that are the subject of international attention,
including privacy, education, and access to information.2 The novelty and increasing frequency of these intersections should give nations pause before they pursue single-mindedly intellectual-property
strategies that proved useful in the industrial era.3 Where intellectual-property policies have been developed in virtual isolation from
consideration of intersections with other areas of law and where
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countries have bound themselves to such policies before recognizing
or evaluating these intersections, it would seem prudent to put off
implementation of undertakings given in the intellectual-property
sphere.4 This chapter will explore these themes with a particular
focus on the emerging area, claimed as intellectual property in international instruments, of confidential information. It will explore the
intersection between this putative form of intellectual property and
the development of personal-data protection (which is a reaction to
increased concern over privacy values).

confidential information
as i n t e l l e c t ua l p ro p e rt y
The term “intellectual property” was not known when the earliest
intellectual-property devices came into the law.5 Trademark, arguably the earliest of the devices, has its antecedents in antiquity, in the
craftspersons’ mark. Patent and copyright, however, arise directly
from the industrial and print revolutions.6 These three categories
form the most widely recognized triumvirate in intellectual property
– but they were more frequently separated in the nineteenth century
than they are in the popular mind today. Trademark and patent were
recognized as “industrial property,” whereas copyright was generally considered on its own.
Patent and copyright were the result of a relatively long line of
social, and hence legal, experimentation with attempts to intervene
and control various markets.7 Patent was an exception to a general
prohibition against national monopolies: it was recognized that
the investments in technology required to advance an industry in
the industrial age merited a guarantee of reward.8 Copyright was
also developed as an incentive to the industrial middleman to invest in the technology necessary to compete in the age of the press.9
Trademark, on the other hand, appears to have developed more or
less as a very early form of consumer protection law.10 But over the
years all three have had in common a public interest aspect that continues to distinguish them from other forms of property interest.11
For example, in patent the Supreme Court of Canada has twice recently reiterated that two of the central objectives of the Patent Act
are “to advance research and development and to encourage broader economic activity.”12 Justice Binnie has been explicit about this
process: “Having disclosed to the public the secrets of how to make
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or use the invention, the inventor can prevent unauthorized people
for a limited time from taking a “free ride” in exploiting the information thus disclosed. At the same time, persons skilled in the art of
the patent are helped to further advance the frontiers of knowledge
by standing on the shoulders of those who have gone before.”13
Both patent and copyright are limited-term monopolies, after
which the inventions and works to which they pertain enter into the
normal competitive marketplace. In patent, the information about
the invention is required to be published immediately, to advance
the state of knowledge in the area of the invention, even though the
right to manufacture, sell, use, and distribute the invention is held
in the monopoly for a period of years. In copyright, the ideas and
facts that are contained in an expression circulate freely in society
throughout the period of the copyright monopoly: only certain uses
of the expression of those ideas and facts are limited to the monopoly holder. Of course, not being held in a monopoly does not necessarily mean that it will be possible to access the information for
free, but rather it opens up the market to other suppliers of the same
expression, which is “an opportunity to produce new editions at a
cheaper price and hence with wider circulation.”14 Making expressions available to the public actually occurs more through depository schemes,15 through access legislation, and through such
mechanisms as Canadian content regulations in broadcasting, than
through the presence or absence of copyright protection. But certain uses of a copyrighted work have not been traditionally included in copyright and are thus always available to the public if the
work is available in any form – for example, reading a literary
work. In trademark, the entire value of the mark rests with the public’s recognition of it and association of it with particular goods: if
the mark is unrecognized or no longer associated in the public eye
with particular goods, then the mark cannot be defended by its
owner against any other user.
What, on the other hand, is the public interest in the protection of
confidential information? If no public interest can be identified, then
what is the theoretical or philosophical link that binds its protection
to the other types of intellectual property? One might point to the
fact that works, inventions, marks, and secrets are all products of the
mind, of the intellect. In this respect, confidential information finds
itself perhaps more closely bound to the ideas and facts that are not
the subject of copyright than to the expressions that are so subject.
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And the subject matter of confidential information may find itself
more often identified with the disclosed information about a patentable invention than with any other aspects of the device of the patent. Furthermore, in defining itself as a product of the mind,
confidential information allies itself with many areas of information
law that are not defined as intellectual property, such as privacy,
libel, and so on. The Supreme Court has clearly shied away from
characterizing the protection of confidential information as related
to property,16 because “the action is rooted in the relationship of
confidence rather than the legal characteristics of the information
confided.”17 Without a clear philosophical underpinning, Canada
may wish to be somewhat cautious about binding international
commitments to such an “intellectual-property” device.
Canada might wish to be even more cautious when the device of
confidential-information protection has only a comparatively short
history in domestic law.18 Canada’s first clear recognition of confidential-information protection was in 198919 – and the Supreme
Court did not take the immediate opportunity to pronounce the
existence of a cause of action in this regard: it did so only when no
other new or old device presented itself.20 Since 1989, Canadian
courts will recompense the confider for a breach
1 if the subject matter was secret or non-public – and then only –
2 if transmitted in circumstances of confidentiality – and then only –
3 if the information would save the confidante time, energy, and
expense and is used in an unauthorized fashion to the detriment
of the confider.21
The current Canadian “device” for protection of confidential information has at least three challenges that set it apart from the
traditional intellectual-property devices developed in the past: it is a
product of judicial decision rather than legislative action22 and thus
at this point cannot be reviewed under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms;23 it is an unbounded monopoly that, if the
conditions of confidentiality are maintained, can last forever (unlike
patent or copyright); and it would appear to have no element of
public interest, other than indirectly in terms of the arguable general
public interest in the success of the national economy (including the
national economy’s interaction with the success of multinational
and foreign businesses).
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c a n a da i n t h e i n t e r n at i o n a l
i n t e l l e c t ua l p ro p e rt y e n v i ro n m e n t
for confidential information
The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was
signed in 1883 and came into force in 1884. It initiated the international intellectual property norm of the principle of national treatment. This principle requires that each member state guarantee to
the nationals of other member states treatment in law no less favourable than is accorded the state’s own nationals.24 The convention created a platform of guaranteed minimum standards for patent and
trademark protection that each member country would provide and,
through it, its members formed the Paris Union.25 As the Union met
from time to time over the succeeding hundred years, new agreements
were reached and came into force when a sufficient number of member states ratified them. However, it was not necessary for every
member state to ratify later instruments in order to continue
as members of the Union. Even in the most recent version of the
Paris Convention, there remains language permitting states fairly
wide latitude in tailoring patent and trademark protection.26
Canada originally acceded to the Paris Convention as a dominion
of Britain, which was an original signatory. When Canada began to
act as a nation internationally it continued participation in the Paris
Union,27 becoming a party in its own right in 1925. Before entering
into the trade commitments that required full adherence to the latest
version in the mid-1990s, Canada had adhered only to the administrative, but not to the substantive, provisions of the latest 1967
Stockholm version of the convention.28
As the empires of the original architects of the Paris Union unravelled, the texture of the Union changed.29 Originally, it had had
an instant global span precisely because the European powers were
able to include their colonies in its scope.30 This created an effective
global economic environment – one of the earliest large, multilateral, and effective ones.31 As the colonies became fully independent
and chose to become members of the Union in their own right, the
dominant economic interests of the Union, which operated democratically, began to shift – much of the enlarged membership consisted of economically underdeveloped nations.
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The chief point about this consensual environment for international cooperation in the protection of industrial property is, however,
that, throughout its history from colonial to post-colonial, protection
of confidential information has had no real place in it. The only consensus that ever developed over the century following the creation of
the Paris Union related to protection of confidential information was
a provision for protection against unfair competition.32
In the United Nations
After the Second World War, international instruments of the newly
formed United Nations were drafted to include references to the
intellectual-property devices represented by the much older international intellectual-property bodies, including the Paris Union, and
these United Nations documents reflected both perspectives inherent
in traditional intellectual property: the reward for authors and creators but also access to information and innovation for society. Such
references occur not only in the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,33 where they might be expected, but also
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states:
1 Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in the scientific advancement and its benefits.
2 Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.34
Eventually, in 1970 the Paris Union and copyright’s Berne Union
formed the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),35
which was formally integrated into the United Nations system
(where it remains today).36 At this point in the 1970s, however, there
was no international instrument that specifically addressed confidential information.
In International Trade Law
By the end of the 1980s the economically powerful members of the
Unions, now joined on all fronts by the United States, which had
formerly boycotted the Berne Union,37 chafed under the consensual
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environment of WIPO.38 As Ronald Bettig points out, “[t]he global
proliferation of communications technologies and the expansion of the
realm of intellectual property is a process that clearly benefits the advanced economies of the United States, Europe and Japan.”39 When
the opportunity arose, encouraged and abetted by increasingly globalized multinational corporations, especially in the pharmaceutical sector,40 these leading states shifted the conversation about intellectual
property away from WIPO and into the modern trade environment.
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in
1986 by the contracting parties of the General Agreement onTariffs and
Trade,41 included a mandate to negotiate in the area of intellectual property.42 The Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994 with the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the inclusion of intellectual
property in its mandate through the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This agreement, which
forms part of the WTO Agreement, contains provisions protecting undisclosed information, particularly secret information with commercial
value and data submitted for the purpose of regulatory or marketing
approval. This development will be reviewed below.
The strategy of the industrialized nations in moving the international coordination of intellectual-property protection from the
consensual environment of WIPO to the trade negotiation environment in the WTO initially proved very successful.43 Although various
issues of disagreement between the industrialized nations that had
become apparent during negotiation largely remained unresolved
when TRIPS emerged, the overall approach of the developed nations
prevailed, and “the developing countries’ proposal was all but forgotten.”44 Throughout this period, Canada’s domestic intellectualproperty policy reflected the pressure of the United States as it drove
forward to strengthen international intellectual-property protections in order to protect its exports:45 “the main impetus for change
in Canada has come ultimately from U.S. corporate and political
forces seeking to strengthen IP protection at the expense of IP dissemination ... Canada initially resisted such pressures but then ultimately adopted them as being in the national interest [emphasis
added] in the new innovation age.”46 In every area of intellectualproperty policy-making, “by the late 1990s the federal government,
in response to pressure and arguments from its industry and trade
departments, was gradually adopting the view that the global agenda was in Canada’s interests”47
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While in the areas of patent and copyright, TRIPS48 drew on over a
century of global experience, cooperating internationally to harmonize
domestic intellectual-property devices by using the texts of the Paris
and Berne Conventions as the threshold for patent protection and
copyright protection, respectively, in the new trade environment, the
international parameters of confidential-information protection were
laid out for the first time in the coercive conditions of trade negotiations.49 Through its inclusion in TRIPS,50 confidential information has
become classed for the first time as intellectual property (whereas
Canada’s Supreme Court has declined to declare it to be such.)51
Article 39 of TRIPS provides that
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed
to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a
manner contrary to honest commercial business practices,52 so
long as such information:
a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
configuration and assembly of its components, generally
known among or readily accessible to persons within circles
that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances,
by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep
it secret.
Article 39(3) provides that “Members, when requiring, as a condition
of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a
considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial
use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure,
except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken
to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.”

the clash of confidential information
w i t h p e rs o n a l - data p ro t e c t i o n
Meanwhile, just as WIPO emerged and the move toward intellectualproperty protection through international trade instruments got
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under way, another area of law was emerging as a response to the
developing information economy and information society: personaldata protection.53 By the late 1970s challenges were being recognized in the looming results of computerization – and, particularly in
Europe, there was starting to be a nascent movement toward implementation of “data privacy” legislation. The value of “privacy” had
been recognized and included in public international instruments
that were created following the Second World War.54 But international consensus about how to operationalize “privacy” was not
necessary, since none of these instruments55 were concerned about
actually integrating information systems between nation-states or
about actually guiding information flows that inevitably occur with
the development of multinationals spanning jurisdictions. European
countries began to seek domestic legislative implementation of privacy values in the face of the emerging data aggregation possibilities
that occurred with increasing memory capacity, processing speed,
and the ubiquity of computers. In less information-rich quarters
than Europe, a concern emerged in reaction to the developing notions of data privacy that enclosing information within nation states
through “privacy” restrictions would doom information-poor countries to even less opportunity relative to information-rich countries
in the emerging “computer age,” and that portability of data between states was very important to ensuring that all nations could
participate in the anticipated information economy.56
The resulting compromise between these two reactions to emerging telecommunications and computer globalization occurred in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (of
which Canada has been a member since its inception in 1960). The
OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data were published in 198157 and were intended
to achieve two purposes: (1) to protect personal information58 and (2)
to ensure the free flow of data between countries.59 Over time, and
with familiarity, the second of these two purposes has been routinely
overlooked and forgotten.60 However, it is important to recall the
dual nature of the purposes the OECD Guidelines were developed to
serve, if only because the connection of the OECD Guidelines to privacy is convoluted.61
The OECD Guidelines were developed through consultation and
are voluntarily adopted: not surprisingly, the guidelines do not dictate to states what information they may seek from their inhabitants.
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Their tenets are relevant only if a state or organization has decided
to seek information from an individual.62 What is clear is that the
guidelines are intended to give an individual who is a data subject
controls on the use of information when the information identifiably
pertains to her or him and the information is in the hands of either
public or private sector organizations.63 Organizations that fall
under personal-data protection regimes are required to adhere to the
dictates of national legislation implementing the OECD Guidelines
so long as the information they hold continues to be identified with
an individual.64 This responsibility arises and continues whether or
not the individual subject is even aware either of the information’s
existence within that organization or of the contents of that information. Moreover, in all Canadian jurisdictions, this responsibility
continues for a number of years after the death of the subject individual.65 The guidelines’ eight principles66 relate to the collection of
personally identifiable information (not whether it can be collected
but how it is to be collected and from whom), the organization’s use
of such information, the dissemination of such information, the retention of the information, and the disposal of the information:67
legislation flowing from the guidelines will control the entire life
cycle of a record containing personally identifiable information
while in the hands of an organization.
Since confidential-information law is intended to protect any information held in confidence by organizations and since personal-data
protection legislation gives individuals control over information about
themselves held by organizations,68 there is inherent potential for conflict, or at least overlap, between these two legal developments.

c o m pa r i n g t h e l e v e l s o f i n t e r n at i o n a l
c o n s e n s u s s u r ro u n d i n g p e rs o n a l - data
protection with the international
coercive environment in
confidential information
While the WTO has a current membership of 153 states, the OECD
has a current membership of only 30 and while the WTO is a trade
initiative with mandatory dispute settlement and sanctions available, the OECD has neither of these enforcement mechanisms. On
the face of it, why would any country pursue personal-data protection in line with the OECD Guidelines with any vigour?
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Two reasons may explain the rapid spread of personal data protection in Canadian law. First, it is largely for domestic political reasons that access to government-held information legislation was
initiated across the country – and it was expedient and perhaps inevitable that personal-data protection legislation, also for the public
sector, became linked with access legislation.69 Second, the European
Union was still the dominant force in the realm of privacy in the
world, and it developed a directive that was worded to convey an
extraterritorial effect.70
In the result, Canada has responded fully to its obligations under the
OECD Guidelines, albeit in the private sector largely spurred on by the
European Data Directive.71 The United States, on the other hand, has
largely ignored the personal-data protection initiative – dodging it entirely for the private sector.72 And, indeed, recent legal developments in
the United States such as the Patriot Act73 have undermined any possibility of personal-data protection in the private sector such as is legislated in Canada. Clear evidence of the incompatibility between the
current Canadian and American environments in this respect is the
decision of the government of British Columbia to forbid personaldata processing by any of its provincial or any municipal government
bodies through any agency or operation in the United States.74

i s t h e r e e v i d e n c e t h a t c a n a d a’ s
b e t t e r i n t e r e s t s l i e i n avo i d i n g
full implementation of its
international obligations?
The Supreme Court in H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd.
v. Canada (Attorney General)
Canada’s domestic experience with the parallel existence of both
confidential-information protection and personal-data protection in
the private sector is less than a decade old. Already there are challenges within this experience. Two examples will be discussed as
illustration. The first is the 2006 decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney
General)75 involving the subtle interplay of protection of confidential information with personal-data protection in the context of the
federal access legislation. The second is Canada’s evolving environment for innovation in the health sector.
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The majority of the Supreme Court in Heinz appears to have intended a triumph for privacy interests.76 Instead, the key result of
the case appears to be that an individual’s right under legislation
involving personal-data protection can be exercised by a corporation without the individual’s knowledge. This result seems to run
counter to the very structure of personal-data protection and access
legislation as they have developed across the country: personal-data
protections are drafted into the statutes as rights of “individuals” –
carefully distinguished from legal “persons” in order to exclude corporate “persons.” Corporations and companies, such as Heinz in
this case (“artificial persons”), are classed as “third parties” in these
statutes (with their own exemptions and protections related to protection of confidential information), not as “individuals” directly entitled
to personal-data protection. In the Heinz case, there were no individuals involved in the proceedings, even though much of the dialogue in
the judgments was about the rights of individuals. Heinz sought to
require the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the government agency
subject to the Access to Information Act that was holding the information subject to an access request, to withhold documents under the
“privacy” exemption normally reserved for individuals.
Heinz had been notified of the request for access by the agency because of its possible interest in parts of the same information as a “third
party.” As a potential “third party” under the legislation, it was appropriate that Heinz be notified, in order that it could decide whether or
not to make representations about why certain of the information, in
which it could claim a “third-party exemption,” should not be released
by the agency to the requestor. The majority of the Supreme Court
noted that legislators in personal-data protection statutes have contemplated and provided for situations in which the individuals involved
consent to release of information about themselves – since the individuals who were the subjects of the information in question were unaware of the proceedings, they did not have that opportunity. The
majority worried that under the federal legislation, absent involvement
in the ongoing proceedings by the individuals who were the subjects of
the information, the federal information and privacy commissioners
lacked power to take direct action to stop the release of the personal
information. The Court’s decision did stop the release of personal data
– but neither directly through objection of the individuals nor through
the actions of the information commissioner but rather indirectly
through the objection of the third-party corporation, Heinz.
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It does not seem appropriate for the Court to have so empowered
third-party organizations, albeit on behalf of individuals, when the
Court itself identified the administration of the act, as legislated, as
inadequate. The majority convinced itself that the “Access Act and
the Privacy Act must be read together, with special emphasis given to
the protection of personal information.” A better interpretation of
the legislative intent in these statutes is that they were intended to
balance access to government information with control over personal information, by the individuals affected, in both public and
private sector settings: protection and control are different concepts.
The minority77 noted the power imbalance that has occurred with
this decision: companies have control over personal-data disclosure
that even the individuals involved lack. The majority, in the name of
protection, wrested some control of personal information away
from individuals, back into the hands of corporations.
While the result in the Heinz case, which gives control over the
disposition of personal data held by one organization to another,
outside organization, is inconsistent with the intent of the OECD
Guidelines and might eventually create problems with European
data exporters because of the European Data Directive, it appears
completely consistent with Canada’s trade obligations with respect
to confidential information. If Parliament steps in to “fix” this interpretation of the Supreme Court and reasserts the control of the individual over personal data, such a legislative intervention is bound to
highlight the tension in the area of government-held information
between the access and personal-data protection regimes and the
protection of confidential information that is represented by the
“third-party” provisions in this legislation – legislation that probably is not entirely consistent with Canada’s obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement.
Medical Innovation
A second looming problem area for Canada in terms of reconciling
personal-data protection and confidential-information protection is
in the health arena. Although personal-data protection in the public
sector in many jurisdictions across Canada has gradually affected
more and more Canadian health-related organizations over the past
quarter century, the coming into force in January 2004 of all of the
federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
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Act (PIPEDA), intended to encompass, among other sectors, virtually
all commercial activities in the health environment, has brought the
challenges in the health sector into stark relief. Taken together, the
various pieces of personal-data protection legislation now in place
affecting health are intended to give patients full access and control
over any data held about them in any medical environment. This is
consistent with the OECD Guidelines.
On the other hand, the medical establishments in four provinces have
succeeded in persuading their legislatures to pass separate, sectoral
legislation for health (combining private and public sector personaldata protection into one single act for the health sector).78 In order to
have the federal Cabinet suspend the operation of PIPEDA in respect of
health organizations involved in commercial activities now to be encompassed in the provincial sectoral health enactments, these provinces
would like to have their legislation deemed equivalent to PIPEDA .79
However, this has occurred in only one province – Ontario.80 The fact
that the legislation in the others has not been deemed equivalent is
strong evidence that these enactments are inconsistent with the federal
government initiative in PIPEDA , as well as with the OECD Guidelines.
Indeed, even in the case of Ontario, the provincial health enactments
privilege, to a great extent, the traditional power of physicians and
medical experts over the patient’s judgment about his or her own
data.81 But even if all this personal health data protection legislation
met the OECD Guidelines, there would still appear to be an unavoidable
conflict between the patient’s right to control information in this environment, as demanded by personal-data protection, and the right of
entities to control confidential information in this environment.
Canada’s Food and Drug Administration, through the Notice of
Compliance (NOC) process,82 is responsible for “approving the marketing of pharmaceutical ... products which utilize new chemical entities,” to use the language of TRIPS article 39(3), quoted above, and
requires “submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort” (i.e., clinical trials)83 –
and so Canada is obliged to “protect such data against unfair
commercial use ... [and] against disclosure.” The only permitted exceptions to these obligations are “where necessary to protect the
public” or where “steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.” There is no permitted exception under TRIPS for meeting the personal-data control rights of
individual patients in such trials.
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The regulation of clinical trials in Canada is currently controlled
in large measure through the administrative processes of ethics
boards, many of which are situated in universities.84 These boards
currently operate through panels (none of which are required to be
composed, in part or in full, by lawyers providing legal advice) making decisions under institutional ethics policies whose drafting has
been guided by the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct in
Research Involving Humans,85 created by Canada’s three large federal funding bodies (the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR), the National Science and Engineering Research Council
(NSERC), and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
(SSHRC)).86 It should be noted that the enabling legislation for the
CIHR actually includes commercialization in its mandate: “encouraging innovation, facilitating the commercialization of health research in Canada and promoting economic development through
health research in Canada.”87 The Tri-Council Policy has been heavily influenced by guidelines prevalent in the medical research environment of the United States, a feature considered very important
by the Canadian agencies because of the number of cross-border drug
trials that occur.88 The authority of this policy flows from the fact that
funding from the three lead federal agencies will not be made available for research if the mandated ethics processes are not met.89
The current content of these ethics guidelines does not reflect the
new realities of the ubiquity of personal-data protection legislation
in Canada today and the range of institutions that can be involved
in any particular health study90 – although it would appear that they
must inevitably come to reflect this new legal reality.91 It seems difficult to envisage how, if patient subjects have the access and control
to which they are entitled under personal-data protection regimes,92
these trials will be able to be conducted in a way that maintains the
confidentiality demanded in TRIPS article 29(3).

conclusion
Canada has a number of international obligations that arise from
two different impulses in information law: control of secrets by commercial entities and control of any information about individuals by
those individuals themselves. Inevitably there are conflicts between
the two. The international instruments involving each have arisen
from different sectors entirely within the international community:
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one, within the past quarter century, from the consensual but small
OECD; the other, despite its rhetoric of a long and inevitable history,
only just over a decade ago in the huge, coercive environment of the
wto. Currently, Canada has entered into specific international obligations in respect of each – and relatively recently has put law in
place in respect of each.
Canada’s short experience in each of these areas of law is revealing practical challenges in respect of the other area. In personal-data
protection, the Supreme Court of Canada has given the right to exercise the censoring of information about identifiable individuals to
corporations whose primary objective is the protection of third-party
confidential information – and not to the individuals who are the subject of the information, as required by the OECD Guidelines to which
Canada is signatory. At the same time, an attempt to legislate in order
to overcome the Supreme Court’s decision in the Heinz case may highlight the potential conflict between confidential-information protection, which Canada must protect pursuant to both TRIPS and NAFTA,
and personal-data protection, particularly in the context of government-held information.93 In health, any personal-data protection
regime that is actually going to be in compliance with Canada’s
international obligations under the OECD Guidelines has not only to
overcome the power of the medical establishment but also, it seems,
to ignore Canada’s obligations in TRIPS article 39(3). In an environment where health issues are a major source of international discontent with TRIPS, where costs associated with health care are an
increasing and major burden for Canada, and where health information is increasingly important at the level of the individual, both as a
subject and as a user, it would seem unwise for Canada to develop
information policy in this sector merely as a reaction to international commitments made a few years ago and increasingly being demonstrated to be in conflict with one another.
Thus, in these and other respects,94 both the Canadian legal environment for protection of confidential information and that for
personal-data protection probably fall short of Canada’s international obligations. Indeed, it appears impossible for Canada to
simultaneously fulfill both sets of obligations fully. Given this impossibility and given the multiplicity of complex information relationships involved in these areas (including perspectives, such as access,
that are not part of either system but are protected in Canada’s
Constitution), it would seem very wise for Canada to develop policy
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in the light of its own understanding of its own information environment and needs, quite apart from reference to any obligations currently in place, and, eventually, to implement only law that has been
fully and dispassionately analyzed from Canada’s own perspective.
Once Canada has developed its own internally consistent and domestically effective policy, it can then use that experience in the appropriate international forums to try to assist in the elimination of
conflicts between international information-related (including intellectual-property) instruments.
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U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (entered into force 2
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4 Particularly when many of these obligations were undertaken during a
period when, as Bruce Doern and Markus Sharaput ultimately conclude
supra note 1 at xii, that “[i]n an overall sense, Canada has become more
of a policy-taker than a policy-maker on matters of IP.”
5 And it should be noted that the concept as defined in the Convention
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, s. 2 (viii), does
not include confidential information per se. Instead, the term “intellectual
property” is defined as including the rights relating to “literary, artistic and
scientific works,” “performances of performing artists, phonograms, and
broadcasts,” “inventions in all fields of human endeavour,” “scientific discoveries,” “industrial designs,” “trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations,” “protection against unfair competition,” and
“all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields.”
6 Ronald Bettig traces the roots of copyright back to the Roman publishing
system but points to the advent of the printing press in 1450 CE as the
genesis of the role of copyright in the European context. See R.V. Bettig,
Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property
(Boulder: Westview Press 1996) at 11 and 16. The earliest-known patent
legislation, the Venetian Patent Act of 1474, also dates from the fifteenth
century – also very early in the industrial revolution in Europe.
7 Between 1484 and 1533 in England, a statute (1 Rich. III, c. 9) that otherwise regulated and restricted foreign businesses in England, contained an
exemption for printing and bookselling. This was replaced in 1538 by the
first of a number of attempts to protect and encourage the indigenous
English trade by licensing (Steele, Procl. No. 176 (Henry VIII, November 16,
1538)). See further L.R. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press 1968).
8 Statute of Monopolies, 1624. This law replaced the earlier prerogative of
the monarch to grant exclusive privileges under “letters patent [or open,
rather than sealed]”and, for most fields of coverage, prohibited the creation of monopolies. In the area of patent, however, it continued the possibility of monopoly, but under the statute rather than through the Crown.
9 Statute of Anne, (1709) 8 Anne c. 19.
10 In United Artists Pictures Inc. v. Pink Panther Beauty Corp., [1998]
3 F.C.534, 225 N.R.82, leave to appeal allowed (1998), 235 N.R.399
(note), but appeal discontinued, the Federal Court of Appeal described
the history of trademark as follows: “Historically, the marketplace has
been very concerned with guaranteeing consumers the quality of goods
that they had come to rely upon in the course of trade ... While the
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Théberge, [2002] S.C.R. 336 Binnie J. wrote “Copyright in this country is
a creature of statute and the rights and remedies it provides are exhaustive” (at 338), and further described the statute as creating a balance
“between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward
for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the
creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated)” (at
para. 30). Despite this history and the clarity of the Supreme Court of
Canada on the matter, it has become fashionable both in Canadian and in
American scholarly circles to identify intellectual property with property.
See, for example, A.A. Keynes & C. Brunet, “A Rejoinder to ‘Canadian
Copyright: Natural Property or Mere Monopoly?” (1979) 40 C.P.R. (2d)
54; W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, “Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective” (1987) 30 J. L. & Econ. 265; F. Easterbrook, “Intellectual
Property Is Still Property” (1990) 13 Harv. J. Law & Pub. Pol. 108; S.
Carter, “Does it Matter That Intellectual Property Is Property?” (1993) 68
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Property” (1998) 68 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 609; A. Moore, Intellectual
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Moore, ed., Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal and International
Dilemmas (New York: Rowan and Littlefield 1997) 17; J. Child, “Moral
Foundations of Intangible Property” in A. Moore, ed., Intellectual
Property: Moral, Legal and International Dilemmas (New York: Rowan
and Littlefield 1997) 57; A. Moore, “Toward a Lockean Theory of
Intellectual Property” in A. Moore, ed., Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal
and International Dilemmas (New York: Rowan and Littlefield 1997) 81;
J. Hughes, “Philosophy of Intellectual Property,” in A. Moore, ed.,
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Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal and International Dilemmas (New
York: Rowan and Littlefield, 1997) 135; N. Siebrasse, “A Property Rights
Theory of the Limits of Copyright” (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 1.
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R.
45, 219 D.L.R. (4th) 577, Bastarache J., for the majority, at 185, citing
Free World Trust v. Electro Sante Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, at para. 24.
Ibid., Binnie J., for the minority, at para. 4. Justice Ginsburg of the United
States Supreme Court demonstrated a slightly different view of patent,
noting that, while patent requires disclosure to the public of the invention,
and in copyright “disclosure [to the public] is the desired objective, not
something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright,” nevertheless, “[f]urther distinguishing the two kinds of intellectual property,
copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge … [while]
the grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others
of the inventor’s knowledge.” See Eldred v. Aschcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 123
S. Ct. 769 (2003), rehearing den’d 538 U.S. 916, 123 S. Ct. 1505 (2003)
at para. 787. However, while acknowledging the learned authority W.
Copinger, Law of Copyright, 7th ed. (1936), cited by Justice Ginsburg, it
seems the better view that patent gives no more monopoly on knowledge
than does copyright and, indeed, provides a statutory requirement that
knowledge of the invention be made public.
T. Drier, “Balancing Proprietary and Public Domain Interests: Inside or
Outside of Proprietary Rights?” in R.C. Dreyfuss et al., eds., Expanding
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the
Knowledge Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) 295 at 305.
Note that Canada’s depository system, in the sense of making government
information available to the public, has not been legislated: see E. Dolan
& L. Vaughan, Electronic Access to Canadian Federal Government
Information: How Prepared are the Depository Libraries? Report to
Depository Services Program, Canadian Government Publishing (Ottawa:
Public Works and Government Services Canada 1997). On the other
hand, there has long been a legislated requirement for publishers to deposit monographs with the National Library of Canada, now the National
Library and Archives of Canada. See Library and Archives of Canada Act,
2004, S.C. 2004, c.11, s. 10.
In R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 1 the Supreme Court
of Canada refused to consider confidential information to be property, at
least in the context of criminal law.
Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R.142, 167
D.L.R. (4th) 577.
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18 By contrast, since even before Canada became independent, it had experience with patent and copyright – enough experience that the two were explicitly included amongst the named heads of power in the division of
power between provinces and federal government in 1867. The
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C.
1985, App. II, No.5, gives both powers explicitly to the federal government: s. 91(22) concerning “Patents of Discovery and Invention” and s.
91(23) concerning “Copyright”.
19 International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R.
574, 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14. The cause of action cannot be maintained per se
in the province of Quebec, where, as a civil law jurisdiction, the cause of
action must be codified. An exact codification of the cause of action for
breach of confidence does not exist, but there are related provisions:
C.C.Q., 1991, c. 64, Art. 1457; 2002, c. 19, s. 15. See further R. Howell,
“Database Protection and Canadian Law,” 2d ed., prepared for the
Department of Canadian Heritage, online: <http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/
ac-ca/progs/pda-cpb/pubs/database/database_e.pdf> and M. Goudreau,
trans. David Vaver, “Protecting Ideas and Information in Common Law
Canada and Quebec” (1994) 8 I.P.J. 189 at 205.
20 Fiduciary obligations law was emerging slowly at about the same time,
but when faced with a case that would have permitted Supreme Court
sanction on either one of the emerging causes of action, in Canadian Aero
Service Ltd. v. O’Malley (1973), [1974] S.C.R.592, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371,
the Supreme Court chose to sanction the emerging doctrine of fiduciary
obligation rather than the notion of an independent action for breach of
confidence. See R.J. Roberts, “Corporate Opportunity and Confidential
Information: Birds of a Feather That Flock Together or Canaeros of a
Different Colour?” (1977) 28 C.P.R. (2d) 68.
21 Paraphrased from the language of the Supreme Court in International
Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 61
D.L.R. (4th) 14.
22 And it is an open constitutional question who has the power to legislate in
this area. For a restrictive view see MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd.
(1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 66 D.L.R. (3d) 1. There has been a similar
challenge in determining jurisdiction over trademark: the federal government claims jurisdiction pursuant to its trade and commerce power (s.
91(2)), but the provinces also claim jurisdiction pursuant to their powers
over “property and civil rights”(s. 92(13)) and “matters of a merely local
or private interest” (s. 92(16)). Under its authority the federal government
has legislated under the Trade-Marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.T-13, as
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amended, but has always left “room” for the provinces by recognizing
other marks through s. 10. Recently, however, in connection with interpretation of s. 7 of the Trade-Marks Act the Supreme Court of Canada
has declared that both statutory and “common law” marks (through s. 10
of the Trade-Marks Act) are creatures of the federal statutory enactment;
see Kirkbi AG and Lego Canada, Inc.,v. Ritvik Holdings Inc./Gestions
Ritvik Inc. (Lego v. Mega Bloks), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 2005 SCC 65. As
will be noted below, the federal government, for reasons similar to those
that have challenged it in the trademark area and will challenge it in the
area of confidential information, legislated boldly in the area of personaldata protection for the private sector but attempted to avoid constitutional challenge by leaving “room” for “equivalent” legislation to be passed by
the provinces, as described further below.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. The s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression includes a right to access information (confirmed in Luscher v. Deputy
Minister of Revenue (Customs and Excise), [1985] 1 F.C. 85 (F.C.A.)) and
is therefore likely the Charter protection that would be raised in a challenge
to legislation involving confidential information protection. Even though
Canada’s common law action for breach of confidence may not completely
satisfy the requirements of NAFTA or TRIPS, the vulnerability of any attempted legislative enhancement of the action to a Charter challenge might
in itself discourage Canadian jurisdictions from legislating in the area.
The principle of national treatment was carried through into the Berne
Convention, concluded in 1886, concerning copyright.
The Berne Convention similarly created a platform for minimum copyright protection, and again, member states were free to adhere to revisions
or not. (There were six revisions, the last being at Paris in 1971).
However, the Berne Convention, even in its earliest versions, reflected a
greater degree of consensus around the basic elements of copyright than
was ever achieved in the Paris Convention around patent and trademark
– and thus nation states enjoyed relatively less freedom to create national
differences in their copyright laws. Its members form the Berne Union.
Basic elements of patent law, such as the term of protection and defined
criteria for patent, were never specified in the Paris Convention. In the
realm of trademark, the Paris Convention does not specify exactly what a
trademark is. Moreover, member states never agreed whether trademark
protection should extend to services as well as goods.
Canada’s participation in the Berne Union parallels its experience in the
Paris Union. Britain was a founding player and agreed to the Berne
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Convention immediately (see International Copyright Act of 1886 (49–50
Vic., c. 33, which applied to Canada as a dominion) and ratified effective 5
December 1887. Canada’s first independent participation in the Berne Union
was through the Rome Convention 1928. Canada’s adherence to the Berne
Convention remained at the 1928 level until international intellectual property moved into the arena of international trade negotiations in 1986.
On 7 July 1970 Canada adhered to Arts. 13–30 of the Stockholm version,
but decided not to adhere to the substantive provisions of Arts. 1–12.
Throughout their histories, the Berne and Paris Unions have been closely
entwined. Indeed the Berne Union has always relied on the larger and
wealthier Paris Union for administrative support. The comments made
here about the Paris Union, therefore, are also applicable to the Berne
Union. One long-standing difference between the two, however, has been
that the United States joined the Paris Union early on but remained outside the Berne Union, although attending to observe its conferences, during the Union’s first century.
Sam Rickertson points out that “[d]espite relatively limited membership,
the geographical sweep of the new [Berne] Union was considerable when
account is taken of the colonial possessions of France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Spain and the U.K.” See S. Rickertson, The Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886–1986 (London:
Centre for Commercial Studies, Queen Mary University, 1987) at 79–80.
There were four pivotal multilateral agreements affecting the information
environment that came into being at the end of the nineteenth century: in
addition to the Paris and Berne Conventions, there was the International
Telegraph Union (1865), since renamed the International
Telecommunications Union, and Universal Postal Union (1874).
The closest provision is Article 10bis: Unfair Competition
(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such
countries effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
i. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;
ii. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit
the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;
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iii. indications or allegations, the use of which in the course of trade, is
liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.
This provision was used as a “hook” to bring confidential information
into TRIPS, a provision in the Paris Convention that was argued to already encompass confidential information and thus to lead naturally to
inclusion of confidential information provisions in TRIPS. TRIPS Art. 39
begins: “(1) In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair
competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967),
Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments and governmental agencies in
accordance with paragraph 3.” See also the drafting history provided in
D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 2d ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 271. It can be seen, however, that the
provisions of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention are actually far more directly related to legal concepts involved in passing off and trademark.
33 ICESCR Art. 15 provides
1 ... the right of everyone:
a. To take part in cultural life;
b. To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
c. To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author.
34 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, G.A. Res.
217(III), U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) at
71, Art. 27.
35 WIPO was created at the Stockholm Conference of 1967 by the
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.
Canada ratified on 26 June 1970.
36 Given the strict economic, trade, and commercial origins of the
unions, this marriage between the intellectual-property unions, which
now exist within the framework of WIPO, and the United Nations
must be philosophically uneasy. This is despite the current economic
interests of the majority of the UN membership and the language of
intellectual property in other UN instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. After all, these unions were formed
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to support and extend national legal monopolies to various
international markets.
The United States joined the Berne Union in 1989.
Under article 28 of the Paris Convention, recourse to the International
Court of Justice is provided – but this dispute settlement mechanism has
remained entirely theoretical and has never been used.
R.V. Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual
Property (Boulder: Westview Press 1996) at 5. Indeed, as mentioned
above, the United States and Japan put forward the first proposal to fully
include intellectual property in the international trade regime. It was
drafts by the European Union and the United States that Daniel Gervais
identifies as dramatically accelerating the process of negotiating TRIPS.
See D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis,
2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 16.
Pat Choate identifies specifically “two US corporate CEOs, John R. Opel of
IBM and Edmund T. Pratt Jr. of Pfizer pharmaceuticals” as the progenitors
of TRIPS: P. Choate, Hot Property: The Stealing of Ideas in an Age of
Globalization (New York: Knopf 2005) at 18.
The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, concluded 30 October
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 4 GATT B.I.S.D. 1 (1969), was provisionally applied
between its “contracting parties” as of 1 January 1948. It contained no
direct provision for intellectual property. GATT was later reformulated and
incorporated into the wto Agreement along with the TRIPS Agreement.
See the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
(1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125.
See the Punta del Este Declaration, WTO Doc. MIN/DEC (20 September
1986) at 7–8, quoted by D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting
History and Analysis, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 11.
I say “initially” because there was a backlash after the adoption of TRIPS. The
Doha Declaration of 2001, to the extent that it addresses intellectual property
at all, reflects mostly the concerns of the developing nations. See Ministerial
Declaration (14 November 2001), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, especially paras. 3, 19.
D. Gervais & E.F. Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada
(Toronto: Thomson Carswell 2005) at 541.
The United States and Japan put forward the first notions of covering all
intellectual property in the international trade environment in the late
1980s: see D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and
Analysis, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003) at 10.
In Canadian Intellectual Property, supra note 1 at 182–3, Bruce Doern
and Markus Sharaput observe that in the copyright environment,

2010-05-18 13:39:28

300

47

48

49

50

Canada’s Implementation of International Law

“copyright enjoyed an ascendancy in the 1990s because it was possible to
Canadian policy-makers to cast it as a cultural policy which, unlike many
other subsidy-based cultural policies which were seen as antithetical to
market liberalism, could be presented as being entirely in keeping with ...
pro-market framework rules.” Further evidence of the American domination of Canadian copyright policy is supplied through Ronald Bettig’s
study by a scholar examining the American experience. See R. Bettig,
Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property
(Boulder: Westview Press 1996). Many of the examples and case studies in
his book involve the co-opting of Canadian intellectual property policy to
the interests of the American entertainment industry elites. Canada is
identified as the American entertainment industry’s “largest ‘foreign’ market in the Western Hemisphere.” Ibid. at 201.
Canadian Intellectual Property, supra note 1 at 183. Dan Dorner’s empirical analysis of the federal government during this period of information
policy development demonstrates also that the federal Department of
Industry, more than any other agency, dominated policy formation at this
time. See D.G. Dorner, “The Essential Services Policy Network:
Organizational Influence in Canada’s Information Highway Policy
Development Process” (2002) 72(1) Lib. Quart. 27–84. It was only on
26 May 1996, however, pursuant to new trade obligations under NAFTA
and TRIPS, that Canada adhered fully to the 1967 Stockholm version of
the Paris Convention. For the same reasons, Canada adhered even a little
later (26 June 1998) to the most recent version of the Berne Convention;
see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
9 September 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, Can. T.S. 1998 No. 18 (last revised
24 July 1971 and amended on 28 September 1979).
The signing of NAFTA, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) preceded the conclusion of
TRIPS but was based on the same international drafting experience. See D.
Gervais & E.F. Judge, Intellectual Property: The Law in Canada (Toronto:
Thomson Carswell 2005) at 556.
This probably makes the environment for patent and copyright much less
risky for many of the players – even though they are now facing an environment of coercion, where non-compliance with obligations brings
with it a dispute resolution mechanism and the possibility of trade sanctions as penalty. In the area of confidential information they have no prior
experience of international harmonization.
The language of NAFTA with respect to confidential information protection differs somewhat from the language that entered the text of TRIPS, as
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will be elaborated on below. However, it will be sufficient at this point in
the discussion to focus on the language in TRIPS.
51 Initially in International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd.,
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, and later in Cadbury Schweppes
Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R.142, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577 the
Court canvassed a number of possible characterizations for the cause of
action for breach of confidence and declined to classify it specifically.
52 The phrase “a manner contrary to honest commercial practices” is defined
in a footnote in TRIPS as follows: “For the purpose of this provision, ‘a
manner contrary to honest commercial practices’ shall mean at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to
breach, and includes the acquisition of undisclosed information by third
parties who knew, or were grossly negligent in failing to know, that such
practices were involved in the acquisition.”
53 Perhaps because the social conditions that it was developed to meet were
so new and on a global scale, the vocabulary in this area became valueladen and confusing almost before any law was formulated – and the term
“privacy” became identified as synonymous with this new area. That identification is not apt, as is described herein, nor is it serving well the development of either the area of privacy law or the area of personal-data
protection law. I have made this point directly in connection with a critique of the recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in BMG
Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 81, 2005 FCA 193. See M.A.
Wilkinson, “Battleground between New and Old Orders: Control
Conflicts between Copyright and Personal Data Protection,” in Ysolde
Gendreau, ed., An Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm: Perspectives
from Canada (Edward Elgar 2008), 305–52. In Canada, only five provinces have legislated privacy. Quebec, Canada’s civil law jurisdiction, gives
privacy its strongest and clearest legal expression in the Quebec Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12. The original Privacy Act
in British Columbia was the first privacy legislation in common law
Canada, S.B.C. 1968, c. 39, now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373, s. 1.
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Newfoundland are the other three common
law provinces ( Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24, s. 2; Privacy Act, R.S.M.
1987, c. P125, s. 2(1); and Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22, s. 3, respectively), and in these three privacy is protected only in surveillance,
eavesdropping, and certain itemized commercial situations.
In the other common law provinces, neither the legislatures nor the
courts have recognized such a tort. As the Manitoba Court of Appeal observed in Bingo Enterprises Ltd. v. Plaxton (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 604,
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41 Man. R. (2d) 19, at para. 17: “It would appear that at common law the
tort of violation of privacy in regard to disclosure of personal information
has not been recognized in Canada. Neither counsel has supplied us with
a case ... Counsel for defendants states simply that the tort has not be recognized although recognized in the United States of America.”
The ambivalence of the common law in general towards privacy has
been highlighted recently in Great Britain: Buxton L.J., speaking for the
English Court of Appeal at paragraph 8 of Ash v. McKennitt, [2006]
E.W.C.A. Civ. 1714., stated: “There is no English domestic tort of invasion of
privacy.” Actions in Britain based upon English Human Rights Act, Art. 8,
which legislates respect for private and family life (and incorporates Arts. 8
and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law),
have been successful but have been founded in breach of confidence.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 12 states that “No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy ... Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
Including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19
December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976). Art. 17 of the ICCPR provides: “(1) No
one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or
reputation; (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.”
C. Bennet, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in
Europe and the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992).
The OECD Guidelines were created as a Recommendation of the Council
of the OECD, becoming applicable 23 September 1980, and are available
at <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM>.
Although paragraph 2 of the OECD Guidelines, concerning their scope, of
the refers to “personal data ... which ... pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties,” the operative sections providing for the treatment of personal data, paragraphs 7–14, do not mention the concept of privacy, but
rather refer throughout to the treatment of “personal data.”
Part 3 of the OECD Guidelines, paragraphs 15–18, is entitled “Basic
Principles of International Application: Free Flow and Legitimate
Restrictions,” and paragraph 16 provides specifically that “Member countries should take all reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that transborder data flows of personal data, including transit through a Member
country, are uninterrupted and secure.” Paragraph 17 provides that “A
member country should refrain from restricting transborder data flows of
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personal data between itself and another Member country [in cases where
the Guidelines are met].”
For example, Mary Marshall and Barbara von Tigerstrom, in their chapter
entitled “Health Information,” in J. Downie et al., Canadian Health Law
and Policy, 2d ed. (Markham, ON: Butterworths 2002) provide brief histories of the right to privacy in international law (at 159) and the right to
privacy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (at 160–4).
They then move on to a discussion of the OECD Guidelines, but without
mentioning the second goal of the OECD Guidelines at all and putting the
whole discussion in the context of privacy. They state that “[w]hile [the
8 principles of the OECD Guidelines] are not all directly related to the protection of privacy, they provide indirect protection (for example, by limiting collection of personal data), and, more generally, serve to safeguard
the basic values of autonomy that underlie the right to privacy” (at 165).
Halyna Perun, Michael Orr & Fannie Dimitriadis, in Guide to the
Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act (Toronto: Irwin Law
2005), completely omit any reference to the OECD Guidelines in their
introductory chapter, focussing entirely on privacy. See ibid., 1–18.
I have previously argued that personal-data protection is philosophically
more closely akin to legislated confidentiality law than to privacy law: see
M.A. Wilkinson, “Privacy and Personal Data Protection: Albatross for
Access?” in K. Adams & W.F. Birdsall, eds., Access to Information in a
Digital World (Ottawa: Canadian Library Association 2004), 109–32 ,
where I point out that viewing personal-data protection from this perspective may help to explain certain decisions of governments to make public information that would otherwise fall under personal-data protection, such as
Ontario’s decisions in the Adoption Information Disclosure Act, S.O. 2005,
c. 25 and the Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 1,
Sch. A, or Nova Scotia’s decision in the Ministerial Education Act Regulation
80/97, as up to N.S. Reg. 120/2006, concerning annual reporting of school
board salaries, made under s. 145 of the Education Act, S.N.S. 1995–96, c.1.
Paragraph 7 of the OECD Guidelines referring to the collection limitation
principle states: “There should be limits to the collection of personal data
and all such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.”
Paragraph 2 of the OECD Guidelines begins: “These Guidelines apply to
personal data, whether in the public or private sectors.”
The definition in paragraph 1(b) of the OECD Guidelines is “‘personal
data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (data subject).”
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65 Federal rules under PIPEDA protect an individual’s information until
twenty years after death or one hundred years after the document was created: see R.S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 7(3)(h)(i)-(ii). British Columbia has legislation with the same time frames: see Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 36. Nova Scotia has
provincial legislation that protects personal information of deceased persons until twenty years after death only: see Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, s. 30(c). Newfoundland’s
legislation protects information for tweny years after a person’s death or
for fifty years after the document was created: see Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1, s. 42(c)(d). Alberta
and Saskatchewan have statutes protecting personal information until
twenty-five years after the individual’s death: see Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25, s. 17(2)(i); The Local
Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.S.
1990–91, c. L-27, s. 29(1)(2); and The Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1990–1991, c. F-22.01, s. 30(2)). Prince
Edward Island’s legislation protects personal information for twenty-five
years after death, or seventy-five years after the creation of the record: see
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.P.E.I. F-15.01,
ss. 15(2)(i) and 40(c)(ii). Ontario and Quebec legislation protects personal
information until thirty years after death: see Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 2(2) and An Act
respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector,
R.S.Q. 1994, c. P-39.1, s. 18.2. Manitoba’s provincial legislation protects
information only until ten years after an individual’s death: see The
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, C.C.S.M. 1997,
c. F175, s. 17(4).
66 Set out in part 2 of the OECD Guidelines, entitled “Basic Principles of
National Application,” at paras 7–14.
67 Paragraph 11 of the OECD Guidelines, the “Security Safeguard Principle,”
provides that “Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure of data.”
68 Specifically, paragraph 10 of the OECD Guidelines, the “Use Limitation
Principle,” states: “Personal data should not be disclosed, made available
or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance
with Paragraph 9 except: (a) with the consent of the data subject; or (b)
by the authority of law.” Paragraph 9 is the “Purpose Specification
Principle,” which provides: “The purposes for which personal data are
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collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such
others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on
each occasion of change of purpose.”
69 The best illustration of this relationship is the extraordinary passage of
the federal Access to Information Act together with the separate Privacy
Act as one enactment: see Access to Information Act and Privacy Act, S.C.
1982, c. 111. The federal personal-data protection legislation, which actually had its antecedent as part 4 of the Human Rights Act in 1977 (S.C.
1977, c. 33), before being re-enacted with the access legislation in 1982, is
now the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 (Canada). The other personaldata protection legislation for the public sector in Canada is the following: Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. F-25 (Alberta); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165 (British Columbia); The Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, S.M. 1997, c. 50 (Manitoba); Right to
Information Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. R-10.3 (New Brunswick); Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.L. 2002, c. A-1.1
(Newfoundland & Labrador); Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c.5 (Nova Scotia); Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 (Ontario); Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.P.E.I. 2001, c. 37 (Prince
Edward Island); An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by
Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information, R.S.Q.,
c. A-2.1 (Quebec); Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act, S.S. 1990–91, c. F-22.01 (Saskatchewan); Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20 (Nunavut &
Northwest Territories); and Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 1(Yukon). Several jurisdictions also have
privacy legislation for the municipal sector: Municipal Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M56
(Ontario) and Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection
of Privacy Act, S.S. 1990–91, c. L-27.1 (Saskatchewan). As will be further discussed below, in four provinces health information, including
health information held in the public sector, has been protected by
separate legislation: Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5
(Alberta); Personal Health Information Act, C.C.S.M. c. P33.5
(Manitoba); Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O.
2004, c. 3, Sch. A (Ontario); and Health Information Protection Act,
S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021 (Saskatchewan).
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70 European Union, Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, EU Council Directive 95/56/EC, [1995] O.J. No. L. 281, p. 31.
71 In Quebec personal-data protection legislation for the private sector predates the EU Directive: see Act Respecting the Protection of Personal
Information in the Private Sector, R.S.Q., c. P-39.1 (1993). However, all
other personal-data protection legislation in Canada is a direct response
to the federal government’s initiative, with the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPEDA],
which responded to the EU Directive. The federal government, for constitutional reasons, left room for, and indeed encouraged, provincial regulation of private sector activities, and some provinces have taken up this
invitation. The federal legislation anticipates the passage of “equivalent”
provincial legislation, by providing that, once recognized as equivalent by
the federal Cabinet, such provincial legislation will replace PIPEDA for
provincial matters within that province: see PIPEDA at s. 26(2)(b).
Quebec’s pre-existing act has already been recognized by the federal government as equivalent to PIPEDA. Several other provinces have passed
legislation for the private sector but have not succeeded in persuading the
federal government that the legislation is equivalent to PIPEDA: see, for
example, Alberta, Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c.
P-6.5, and British Columbia, Personal Information Protection Act,
S.B.C. 2003, c. 63. Consequently, organizations in those provinces
must satisfy both regimes. As noted, several other provinces have passed
specific personal-data protection legislation for the health sector. In
Ontario’s case, this legislation has been deemed equivalent to PIPEDA
by the federal government.
72 See the International Safe Harbor Privacy Principles issued by the U.S.
Department of Commerce (July 21, 2000), online: <http://www.ita.doc.
gov/td/ecom/Principles1199.html>. The principles were developed in
consultation with industry and the general public to facilitate trade and
commerce between the United States and EU. The EU was persuaded to
accept this voluntary system as compatible with its directive. Few of the
targeted private organizations have applied to be certified. This record
is to be contrasted with the fully legislated administrative schemes created in Canada. Personal-data protection law is not an issue for organizations in the American health sector. In this connection see further
W.W. Lowrance, “Privacy and Secondary Use of Data in Health
Research” (2003) 8 Suppl 1 J. Health Services Research & Pol.
13–28 at 17–18.
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73 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of
2001, H.R. 3162 (2001).
74 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act Amendment Act
2004, S.B.C. 2004, c. 64 (“Bill 73”).
75 [2006] S.C.R. 441, 266 D.L.R. (4th) 675.
76 Justice Deschamps, writing for himself and Binnie, Fish and Abella JJ. in
the majority, clearly holds that privacy trumps access to government-held
information and is “quasi-constitutional.” Promptly thereafter, the Federal
Court of Appeal referred to Heinz in Canada (Information Commissioner)
v. Canadian Transportation Accident Safety Investigation & Safety Board,
[2007] 1 F.C.R. 203, 267 D.L.R. (4th) 451, acknowledging the paramountcy of privacy.
77 The minority (McLachlin C.J.C., Bastarache, LeBel JJ.) maintained that
corporate parties should be limited under these statutes to claiming the
exemptions specifically targeted for them by the legislators.
78 As noted, these are Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5, (Alberta);
Personal Health Information Act, C.C.S.M. c. P33.5 (Manitoba); Health
Information Protection Act, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021 (Saskatchewan); and
Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sch. A
(Ontario).
79 As noted, the provision for this process is contained in PIPEDA s. 26(2)(b).
80 See Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act:
Health Information Custodians in the Province of Ontario Exemption
Order, C. Gaz. 2005.I.331.
81 In this connection see the study by W. Peekhaus, “Personal Medical
Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection?” (July 2006) 5:2 Can.
J. Law & Tech. 87.
82 The Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, as am., is the mechanism
used by the federal government to protect public health and safety by ensuring that only approved products are distributed in Canada. A food or
drug product may not be marketed in Canada until a Notice of
Compliance (“NOC”) has been issued under the Food and Drug
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, ss. C.08.002(1) and C.08.004. The Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, S.O.R./93–133, were actually enacted under s. 55.2(4) of the Patent Act, R.S.C.1985, c. P-4, as
am., and came into force on 13 March 1993. They were substantially
amended in 1998 (C. Gaz. Part II, Col. 132, No. 7 at1051 (1998)) and
again in 2006 (Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations Registration, S.O.R./2006–242 (5 October 2006)).
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They are intended to link the Patent Act to the Food and Drugs Act by
prohibiting the minister of health from allowing drugs that are the subject
of a valid patent to be distributed in Canada by anyone not claiming
through the patent.
83 A generic drug manufacturer who can show that the drug for which the
NOC is being sought is equivalent to a drug already approved is able to file
an abbreviated submission for the NOC without having to do extensive
clinical studies: see Food and Drug Regulations, s. C.08.002.1(2)(a)
and (g)–(i).
84 Many commentators considering the ethics process in health research fail
to discuss the relationship of law to the process at all: see for example
E. Whittaker, “Adjudicating Entitlements: The Emerging Discourses of
Research Ethics Boards” (2005) 9 Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal
for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine 513, and M. Aita &
M.-C. Richer, “Essentials of Research Ethics for Healthcare Professionals”
(2005) 7 Nursing and Health Sciences 119. Even when legal parameters are
acknowledged, personal-data protection is often overlooked: see B.M. noppers, “Consent Revisited: Points to Consider” (2005) 13 Health L. Rev. 33.
85 Curiously, the composition of the boards, at least for biomedical research, is meant to include someone knowledgable in law, but even in
that area that person is not to provide legal advice. Membership of the
REB shall consist of at least five members, including both men and
women, of whom “ a) at least two have broad expertise in the methods
or in the areas of research that are covered by the RED; b) at least one
member is knowledgeable in ethics; c) for biomedical research, at least
one member is knowledgeable in the relevant law; this is advisable but
not mandatory for other areas of research; d) at least one member had
no affiliation with the institution, but is recruited from the community
served by the institution.”
The role of the member knowledgeable in the applicable law is to alert
REBs to legal issues and their implications, not to provide formal legal
opinions nor to serve as legal counsel for the REB. An understanding of
relevant legal issues and contexts is advisable for all REBs, although for
non-biomedical research such insights may be sought from someone who
sits on the REB only for specific research projects. The institution’s legal
counsel should not be a member of the REB. Tri-Council Policy Statement:
Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Canadian Institute of
Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada,
1998) at 1.3.
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86 In M. Hirtle, “The Governance of Research Involving Human Participants
in Canada” (2003) 11 Health L. J. 137 at 148, Marie Hirtle asks, “[i]s an
administrative model appropriate for what is closest to becoming the national standard for research in Canada or should other types of standards
(ethical, legal, professional or scientific) be considered?”
87 Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act, S.C. 2000, c. 6, s. 4(i).
88 For example, in the Ethics Review Board Application Form for Research
Involving Human Subjects in a medical context at the University of
Western Ontario, question 1.2 is “Is this a U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) monitored study?” The first question involving
Canada occurs later, at question 1.11, namely, “Does this project require
Health Canada approval?” Question 12.2 accepts that the FDA may require access to identifiable or confidential data for monitoring or auditing
purposes: see <http://www.uwo.ca/research/ethics/med/hsreb-forms.htm.>
89 It is interesting that CIHR’s Commercialization and Innovation Strategy
document of November 2005 includes a heading “Ethical Perspective,”
which states “Conscious of the issues that arise from the academic/industry interface and the potential for ethical conflict between profit and the
public good, CIHR will lead an industry/university effort that will review
and propose standards for ethical conduct of projects in the commercialization and innovation areas.” Nowhere in the document is there a discussion of the legal aspects of these relationships – or, indeed, any mention at
all of the interests of patients involved in these processes. Patients are
mentioned only as one of several designated recipients of one of the
sought-after outcomes of the strategy: “accelerated drug and device development, which would ensure prompt delivery of discoveries to community, caregivers and patients.” The description of clinical research notes
that research is “a key ‘bench to bedside’ link. Unless the training and careers of clinical researchers are better supported, and the specialized facilities for clinical research are available to clinical researchers in Canada,
this will limit CIHR’s and Canada’s capacity for commercialization and innovation.” See online: <www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/cgi-bin/print-imprimer.pl.>
90 The Tripartite Panel on Research Ethics has just released seventeen reports
from working committees considering revisions to the policy statement:
see <www.pre.ethics.gc.ca>, under “Publications and Reports.” Among
these, reports such as the SSWC [Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Ethics Special Working Group] Recommendations Regarding Privacy
and Confidentiality (February 2008) and the Ethics Review of Research
in Multiple Settings and/or Involving Multiple REBs (previously multicentred ethics review): A Discussion Paper and Recommendations
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(April 2008) briefly comment on the need to reconcile the policy with applicable legislation. The conclusion that this need exists is also supported
by empirical research, sponsored by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada, just completed by M.A. Wilkinson and M.
Perry: for preliminary indications, see M.A. Wilkinson, “Social Sciences
and Humanities Research and the Protection of Privacy in Universities,”
a paper presented in the Privacy and Access Issues across the Professions:
Ethics at Ryerson series (April 2007); online: <http://www.ryercast.
ryerson.ca/dmpstreams/ethics2007april/index.asp.>
91 The possible impact of personal-data protection legislation on health research has been contemplated in K. Weisbaum et al., “A Voluntary Privacy
Standard for Health Services and Policy Research: Legal, Ethical and
Social Policy Issues in the Canadian Context” (2005) 14 Health L. Rev. 42
at 44; D. Willison, “Privacy and the Secondary Use of Data for Health
Research: Experience in Canada and Suggested Directions Forward”
(2003) 8 Suppl.1 Journal of Health Services Research Policy S1–17–23;
and D. Willison, “Trends in Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal
Information in Contemporary Health Research: Challenges for
Governance” (2005) 13 Health L. Rev. 107.
92 Given the primary focus of the CIHR on commercialization and the barriers to that process that differing provincial regimes and personal-data
protection can pose in general, it is perhaps not surprising that the CIHR
has taken a lead role in trying to standardize this area. The CIHR commissioned the CIHR Best Practices for Protecting Privacy in Health Research
(Ottawa: Canadian Institutes for Health Research 2005). Although the
document acknowledges that the law in this area differs across Canada
and that various statutes govern practice in each jurisdiction and although
it states that its guidelines are not to be relied on (at 26), the document
nevertheless purports to be able to give health care practitioners a uniform
code of practice for anywhere and everywhere within Canada. As such, it
is misleading. In the health legislation of the four provinces that have
passed it, including Ontario, patients’ control over personal information
has been muted to reflect and preserve the professional judgments of medical personnel by adding a notion of implied patient consent to the traditional personal-data protection legislative standard of express consent in
information situations (for example, see Ontario’s Personal Health
Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c. 3, Sch. A, s. 18(2)). Under
PIPEDA, express consent is the norm. It has already been noted that in
the three provinces, apart from Ontario, with specific health legislation
in this area, patients may still have rights under PIPEDA and patients in
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the remaining provinces and territories will have rights under PIPEDA in
applicable situations.
93 Canada would probably prefer to avoid close scrutiny of its confidentialinformation protection provisions in the access and personal-data protection arena altogether. For example, under Ontario’s access legislation in
the public sector, if an organization holds a trade secret or certain other
information from a third party, that information will be released to a requestor unless it has been supplied in confidence and disclosure would
have one of a series of legislated consequences. This may be too narrow to
comply with TRIPS, let alone NAFTA; see Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, s. 17.
94 NAFTA requires protection of information of potential commercial value,
which Canada’s common law test, set out above, does not cover, although
NAFTA requires only protection of trade secrets and thus would appear to
be narrower in that respect than the protection that Canada offers.
However, under either the NAFTA or the TRIPS standard, Canada’s requirement that the confider show detriment and benefit to the confidante
is probably a higher standard than the demonstration of “commercial
value” in international standards.
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